

MAY 2019

# LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWSLETTER

## A MESSAGE FROM BILL CERVONE STATE ATTORNEY

As this newsletter goes to print (electronically, at least) the legislature is winding down its 2019 session. Until they actually leave Tallahassee, as the old saying goes, none of us are safe. Until that happens it is also impossible to be certain what the end result of the session will be but it is certain that there will be some changes of importance to all of us.

Still on the fast track is a revision to the theft laws. It is all but certain that there will be a new cutoff for Grand Theft vs Petit Theft. Most likely that will be somewhere between \$750-1000, and along with that shift will be related changes to various other parts of the theft laws

such as when values can be aggregated to enhance the level of crime involved. Everyone should be aware of this coming change and watch for its effective date, which could be either July 1 or October 1.

Changes are also coming to some of the mandatory drug sentencing provision that currently exist. It is likely that when all is said and done judges will be given increased authority to override otherwise low level mandatory sentences in the range of 3 or 7 years if they make certain findings.

The legislature continues to debate the process of adult prosecutions for serious juvenile offenders. Despite the Senate especially pushing for

an end to the SAO having the authority to direct file these cases it is unlikely that any change will actually be implemented other than the elimination of a few mandatory direct file requirements that the State Attorneys have agreed are unnecessary.

The larger debate about so-called criminal justice reform continues and will continue after the session ends and throughout the summer before next year's legislative session even begins. Reductions to the 85% rule should not be considered safe from those discussion and tiny little nibbles around the edges of that approach continue to creep in. A proposed reduction to 65% service of sentence for most "non-violent" felonies remains in play although its passage seems unlikely. The Florida Sheriff's and Police Chief's Associations have been especially helpful in working to prevent this. All of us would do well to monitor those conversations through our respective associations.

As always, once the session ends and the Governor acts on whatever legislation is passed by either signing it or not we will update everyone, mostly through the September newsletter. Anything of significant importance that might be effective earlier will be circulated for your information.



### INSIDE THIS ISSUE

MESSAGE FROM BILL CERVONE	1
SAO STAFF CHANGES	2
CONGRATULATIONS	2
LE MEMORIALS	3
TWITTER	3
RECENT CASE LAW	4-8
NEWS FROM FHSMV	9-13



**We're on the web:**  
**Www.sao8.org**

**REMINDER:**  
**LAW ENFORCEMENT**  
**NEWSLETTER NOW ON-LINE**

The Law Enforcement Newsletter is now available on-line, including old issues beginning with calendar year 2000. To access the Law Enforcement Newsletter go to the SAO website at <www.sao8.org> and click on the "Law Enforcement Newsletter" box.



Any changes in agency email addresses should be reported to our office at  
clendeninp@sao8.org.

For a copy of the complete text of any of the cases mentioned in this or an earlier issue of the Legal Bulletin, please call Chief Investigator Paul Clendenin at the SAO at 352-374-3670.

## SAO STAFF CHANGES

ASA Brian Rodgers resigned from his position in the Gainesville sex crimes unit in January in order to enter private practice. ASA Chris Elsey also resigned from his position managing the firearms prosecutions unit in February to take a position with the United States Attorney's Office.

ASA Brian Kramer has assumed supervisory responsibilities for the firearms prosecutions unit in Gainesville. ASA Pam Gordon will be transferred to the Gainesville sex crimes unit, and ASA Brooke King will re-

turn to the Gainesville office to take over Pam's previous felony case load.

ASAs Lenora Folston and Arielle Claude will switch positions in May, with Lenora returning to her county court position in Levy County and Arielle taking over Lenora's Gainesville County Court case load.



## Congratulations To...

ASA Maddie Grippin, who became a first time mom with the birth of baby son Benjamin on February 5th.

The Newberry High School Academy of Criminal Justice and Director/High Springs Police Department Officer Patrick Treeese for having recently won the Florida Public Service Association state championship for the 4th consecutive year. The Academy sent 48 students to the competition and bested 13 other participating schools, winning 11 separate 1st place trophies in the process.

Former ASO deputy and Marion County Acting Sheriff Emery Gainey, who has been in the position of law enforcement liaison for former Attorney General Pam Bondi, has been named Chief of Staff for new Attorney General Ashley Moody.


ASA Scott LaPeer and his wife Genna, who is an ASA in Ocala, who became first time parents as well on April 30th, welcoming son Jackson.



## LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIALS

Both Alachua County and Baker County will hold their annual Law Enforcement Memorials on May 9th. The Alachua County memorial service will be at the memorial site in the Veterans Memorial Park off of Tower Road in Gainesville beginning with a reception at 6pm and the memorial at 7pm. The Baker County ceremony will be at the Christian Fellowship Temple in Macclenny at 6:30pm

The combined Bradford-Union County Memorial was held in Lake Butler on April 25th and hosted this year by the Department of Corrections. Newly appointed Department of Corrections Secretary Mark S. Inch was the guest speaker.



**The SAO Is  
Now On Twitter**

The **SAO** has established a Twitter feed to better disseminate information to the media and others such as law enforcement agencies. Like us at #8THCIRCUITSAO. For more information contact Deputy Chief Investigator Darry Lloyd at 352-374-3670.



## Recent Case Law

### "Finger" Is Protected Speech

Officer Matthew Minard pulled over Debra Cruise-Gulyas for speeding. He wrote her a ticket for a lesser violation, known as a non-moving violation. As she drove away, apparently ungrateful for the reduction, she gave him the "finger." That apparently was not appreciated by Minard. He immediately pulled her over a second time, less than 100 yards from where the initial stop occurred, and changed the ticket to a moving violation—a speeding offense and a more serious violation of state law.

Cruise-Gulyas sued Minard under § 1983, alleging that he violated her constitutional rights by pulling her over a second time and changing the original ticket to a more serious violation. She claimed he unreasonably seized her in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and retaliated against her because of her protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Minard moved to dismiss the case against him. The trial court denied his motion. On appeal the U.S. Court of appeals affirmed that ruling.

#### Issue:

Did the second traffic stop, after the first was completed, violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights? **Yes.** Was the defendant's use of the "finger" protected speech under the First Amendment? **Yes.**

#### Fourth Amendment:

Under the facts set forth in the case,

Minard violated Cruise-Gulyas's right to be free from an unreasonable seizure by stopping her a second time without renewed probable cause. There is no question that Minard seized Cruise-Gulyas within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he pulled her over the second time. However, to justify that stop, Minard needed probable cause that Cruise-Gulyas had committed a traffic violation, or reasonable suspicion that she had committed a crime. He could not rely on the original driving infraction to satisfy that requirement. Any authority to seize her in connection with that infraction ended when the first stop concluded. *Rodriguez v. United States*, (S.Ct.2015). See also, *State v. Diaz*, (Fla. 2003), "...While the officer's reason for the initial stop may arguably have been legitimate, once that bare justification had been totally removed, the officer's actions in further detaining Mr. Diaz equated to nothing less than an indiscriminate, baseless detention..."

The U.S. Court of Appeals noted, "That leaves Cruise-Gulyas's gesture as a potential ground for the second stop. But the gesture did not violate any identified law. The officer indeed has not argued to the contrary. Nor does her gesture on its own create probable cause or reasonable suspicion that she violated any law. See, *Swartz v. Insogna*, (2d Cir. 2013) ('This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity.'). All in all, Officer Minard clearly lacked

authority to stop Cruise-Gulyas a second time."

#### First Amendment:

Cruise-Gulyas also argued that Minard violated her free speech rights by stopping her the second time in retaliation for her expressive, if vulgar, gesture. Case law dictates that to succeed on this point she must show that (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) Minard took an adverse action against her that would deter an ordinary person from continuing to engage in that conduct, and (3) her protected conduct motivated Minard at least in part.

Legions of prior case law clearly established the first and second elements. Unfortunately for Minard, any reasonable officer would know that a citizen who raises his/her middle finger engages in speech protected by the First Amendment. *Sandul v. Larion*, (6th Cir. 1997) (gesturing with the middle finger is protected speech); see also, *Cohen v. California*, (S.Ct.1971). "It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive ["Fuck"] a criminal offense. Because that is the only arguably sustainable rationale for the conviction here at issue, the judgment below must be reversed."

Again, the Court of Appeals noted, "An officer who seizes a person for Fourth Amendment purposes



without proper justification and issues her a more severe ticket clearly commits an adverse action that would deter her from repeating that conduct in the future. The Constitution suggests as much by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.”

“Cruise-Gulyas also meets the third element, a fact-intensive question in this instance. She alleged in the complaint that Minard stopped her because she made a crude gesture. That counts as a cognizable, and clear, violation of her speech rights.”

#### **Court’s Ruling:**

The Court of Appeals ruled that Cruise-Gulyas could not be stopped a second time in the absence of a new violation of the law, that she had a free speech right to make the “finger” gesture, and that the gesture did not violate any identified law.

“Fits of rudeness or lack of gratitude may violate the Golden Rule. But that doesn’t make them illegal or for that matter punishable or for that matter grounds for a seizure. ... Because Cruise-Gulyas did not break any law that would justify the second stop and at most was exercising her free speech rights, we affirm the [trial] court’s order denying Officer Minard’s [dismissal] motion.”

“Minard adds that no case put him on notice about this fact pattern—that a second stop after a first stop supported by probable cause violated Cruise-Gulyas’s Fourth Amendment rights. Defined at that specific level of generality, he says, the case law did not clearly prohibit the stop. But Minard misses a point. In making his argument, he fails to acknowledge that *the second stop was distinct from the first stop, not a*

*continuation of it.* At this stage, we must accept Cruise-Gulyas’s allegations—that Minard stopped her twice—as true. In that light, case law clearly requires independent justification for the second stop. No matter how he slices it, Cruise-Gulyas’s crude gesture could not provide that new justification.”

“In his reply brief, Minard analogizes his case to a prosecutor who might reasonably think he could take a plea deal off the table if a defendant behaved offensively or a judge who might reasonably think that she could increase a defendant’s sentence if the defendant raised his middle finger at her right after she read her sentence from the bench. Judges, it is true, have wide latitude to consider expressive conduct during sentencing. But we need not wade through those complicated questions now because these facts differ materially. As alleged, the first stop had ended, a constitutionally significant event, before the officer initiated the second, unjustified stop. The Supreme Court has said that any justification for the first stop ceases when that stop ends. These facts more closely resemble a prosecutor who tries to revoke a defendant’s deal a few days after everyone has agreed to it or a judge who hauls the defendant back into court a week or two after imposing a sentence based on the defendant’s after-the-fact speech. Those examples seem more problematic and more in keeping with today’s decision. Minard, in short, clearly had no proper basis for seizing Cruise-Gulyas a second time. We affirm.”

#### **Lessons Learned:**

Once again, the universal truth that, “no act of kindness goes unpun-

ished” is at play here. The officer’s downward departure of the traffic violation was rewarded with a one-finger salute. Unfortunately, the courts have, in essence, ruled that the officer is paid to take abuse.

“This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity.”

“Indeed, such a gesture alone cannot establish probable cause to believe a disorderly conduct violation has occurred. ‘The disorderly conduct statute at issue here does not circumscribe pure speech directed at an individual. Rather, it is directed at words and utterances coupled with an intent to create a risk of public disorder...’ And because an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed that probable cause existed, neither [officer] was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity ...” *Swartz v. Insogna*, (2Cir. 2013).

See also, Legal Bulletin #13-04, “The ‘Finger’ is not Disorderly Conduct,” January, 2013.

**Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard**  
U.S. Court of Appeals – 6<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
(March 13, 2019)

#### **Failure to Maintain a Single Lane**

Deputy received information from county jail clerk that Melissa Peterson who was visiting an inmate was planning a drug drop over the jail fence. She was placed under surveillance. The deputy testified that he and the other deputies were watching to see if Peterson “was going to ...

throw something over the gate." The deputy further testified that after Peterson failed to do so and began to drive away, the deputies decided to follow her and "wait for probable cause to stop [her]."

Deputy came into contact with Peterson after stopping her vehicle because she failed to maintain a single lane of traffic on two occasions. The deputy admitted that there was no oncoming traffic, that the stop occurred during the daytime, that Peterson was traveling on a one-way street, and that there were no bikes in the bike lanes next to Peterson's lane of travel. The deputy also admitted that he did not observe Peterson impact traffic in any way when her vehicle crossed over the line and that he did not see any pedestrians in the area. The deputy was asked whether the traffic stop was initiated as "a proxy to make contact ... and conduct a search if possible." The deputy candidly responded: "We're always looking to get into vehicles, as I work in narcotics and drug and addiction. My main goal is to enter every vehicle I pull over to see what's inside that vehicle. So I was not singling her out by any means."

The sergeant came into contact with Peterson after she was stopped for the traffic violation. During the traffic stop, Peterson made a statement indicating that she had weapons in the vehicle. As a result, Peterson's purse was searched and drugs were found. At that point, Peterson was arrested.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that Deputy lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop based solely on her failure to maintain a single lane of

traffic where her conduct did not create a reasonable safety concern. She also argued that information that a jail clerk had relayed to Deputy about a conversation between Peterson and a jail inmate did not provide Deputy with a reasonable suspicion that Peterson had committed or was about to commit a crime. Thus, Peterson argued that an investigatory stop was not warranted.

The trial court denied Peterson's suppression motions, concluding that the stop was justified because "the information provided as far as what happened at the jail visitation was sufficient to justify an investigatory detention." The trial court also apparently concluded that Peterson committed a traffic violation, finding that "the civil infractions ... did occur." On appeal, the D.C.A. reversed the trial court ruling.

#### **Issue:**

Was the deputy's observation of defendant failing to maintain a single lane twice grounds for a lawful traffic stop? **No**, unless that driving endangered others.

#### **Failure to Maintain a Single Lane:**

Not all moving violations constitute arrestable offenses. There are a class of violations that require the motorist to place himself or others at risk of harm. This was emphasized in *Jordan v. State*, (5DCA 2002):

"In the instant case, we must agree with Jordan that the record is insufficient to establish that his vehicular movements, as testified to by the arresting officer, created any danger to himself or other traffic. Indeed, the testimony of the officer clearly established that other vehicles, including his own, were not in danger by Jordan's driving. There

was no testimony indicating that Jordan was intoxicated or otherwise impaired, nor was any erratic driving pattern established.

"The applicable statute in this case recognizes that it is not practicable, perhaps not even possible, for a motorist to maintain a single lane at all times and that the crucial concern is safety rather than precision. We believe that the arresting officer's testimony at the suppression hearing failed to establish probable cause to reasonably believe that Jordan had committed any traffic infraction justifying the stop of his vehicle, even under the objective test of *Whren v. United States*, (S.Ct.1996)."

#### **Court's Ruling:**

"Section 316.089(1), F.S., provides in relevant part that: 'whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic ... a vehicle shall be driven *as nearly as practicable* entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.'

"Generally, traffic stops are deemed reasonable 'where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.' The validity of a traffic stop is judged on an objective basis, and therefore, 'the subjective knowledge, motivation, or intention of the individual officer involved [is] wholly irrelevant.' Here, the transcript reflects that no traffic violation occurred."

"This court, along with other Florida appellate courts, has refused to find a violation of this statute where a driver's failure to maintain a single lane did not endanger himself or herself or anyone else. ...



And while a driver's failure to maintain a single lane, coupled with a suspicion of impairment, unfitness, or vehicle defects, can give rise to probable cause for purposes of a traffic stop, there was no testimony that such circumstances existed in this case."

"Here, the deputy testified that he observed Peterson's vehicle cross the solid white line twice within a mile-and-a-half distance. However, the deputy acknowledged: (1) this occurred on a one-way street with a bike lane on each side, (2) there was no oncoming traffic, (3) he did not see any bicycles on the street at the time, (4) he did not see any pedestrians affected, (5) Peterson's conduct did not impact traffic in any way, and (6) he did not assume that Peterson was under any impairment at that time. We hold that because there was no evidence that Peterson's crossing the white line on two occasions created a reasonable safety concern, the deputy did not have probable cause to believe that Peterson violated section 316.089(1). Consequently, the traffic stop could not be justified on that basis, and we must next determine whether an investigatory stop was warranted based on the other information relayed from the jail visitation clerk to the sergeant."

"'Police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause.' *State v. Teamer*, (Fla. 2014) (quoting *United States v. Sokolow*, S.Ct.1989)."

"Here, there is no dispute that the tip concerning Peterson's

possible involvement in a drug drop at the jail came from a known citizen informant. Such a tip ordinarily 'falls at a higher end of the reliability scale.' The problem in this case is not the reliability of the visitation clerk. Rather, the problem is that the information relayed by the clerk consisted of nothing more than vague portions of a conversation that the clerk construed as suspicious coupled with the clerk's assumption that Peterson was under the influence of drugs based on her physical demeanor. The information did not create or support a reasonable suspicion that Peterson had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. ... Also notable is the fact that the deputies did not observe Peterson engage in a drug drop at the jail or any other suspicious conduct prior to conducting the traffic stop."

"Thus, the only information which could have formed the basis for an investigatory stop was the content of Peterson's conversation with her boyfriend that was overheard and relayed by the visitation clerk. But as already explained herein, that conversation consisted of nothing more than generalized, allegedly suspicious statements which did not result in any observed criminal conduct. Accordingly, that information could not have provided a reasonable suspicion that Peterson had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. And, therefore, the traffic stop could not be justified on that basis."

"Because the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause that Peterson had committed a violation of section 316.089(1) or by a reasonable suspicion that Peterson had committed, was committing, or

was about to commit a crime, the trial court should have granted Peterson's dispositive motions to suppress. Accordingly, we Reverse."

#### **Lessons Learned:**

In *Baden v. State*, (4DCA 2015), the officer testified in detail as to how the defendant's driving endangered pedestrians and other motorists. The D.C.A. noted, "When determining whether an officer has 'a reasonable or well-founded suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify an investigatory stop, the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken into account.'"

"Relevant factors used to determine if reasonable suspicion exists include: 'the time; . . . the location; . . . the behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in the light of the officer's knowledge.' *State v. Stevens*, (4DCA 1978). Erratic driving suffices to establish a founded suspicion and to validate a DUI stop. *What establishes one's driving as 'erratic' is determined on a case-by-case basis as there is no statutory definition of erratic driving.* In the case at hand, defendant was observed, at about 2:00 a.m., driving a scooter in a careless manner, seemingly oblivious to the parked cars right ahead of her. As such, we hold that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and question defendant."

As the D.C.A. noted above, these legal issues are often **fact specific**. "Bad facts make for bad law - Good facts make good law." It is incumbent on the officer to write a complete and factual report, as did the officer in *Baden v. State*, setting forth all his/her observations, and

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thought processes based upon their experience, knowledge, and training. All of which should be set out in detail in the report.

In the present case the 2<sup>nd</sup> D.C.A. recognized the slippery-slope the statute creates. "We acknowledge that, in application, [statute] presents challenges to law enforcement officers who are asked to make split-second decisions as to whether a driver's conduct creates a reasonable safety concern. What may be a reasonable safety concern under one set of facts may not rise to that level under a slightly different set of facts. For that reason, the legislature may want to consider whether section 316.089(1) should be clarified to provide law enforcement with better guidance as to the scope of what constitutes a reasonable safety concern."

**Peterson v. State**  
**2<sup>nd</sup> D.C.A.**  
**(March 6, 2019)**



## NEWS FROM DHSMV: RE-DESIGNED DRIVE LICENSE



Terry L. Rhodes  
Executive Director

2900 Apalachee Parkway  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500  
[www.flhsmv.gov](http://www.flhsmv.gov)

April 23, 2019

State Attorney's Office  
8th Judicial Circuit  
William Cervone, State Attorney  
120 W. University Avenue  
Gainesville, FL 32601

Dear Honorable Cervone:

In 2017, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (FLHSMV) began issuing a redesigned Florida driver license and ID card to provide enhanced security features for customers, better protecting against identity and driver license fraud. As you may recall, the redesign also included the intent to remove the magnetic strip on the back of the credential in 2019 and be replaced with an enhanced security feature. Law enforcement involvement, in conjunction with other stakeholders, has been a crucial component to developing and implementing these security measures.

Enclosed are details regarding the modified Florida driver license and ID card which will be available at select locations starting in May 2019. Modifications to the credential includes the removal of the magnetic strip, the addition of a tactile feature and changes to the data and data layout to keep Florida's credential the most secure over-the-counter credential on the market today.

By the end of August 2019, the modified credential will be available at all service centers throughout Florida and online. Though previous driver license and identification cards will still be in use alongside the enhanced credential until they are replaced or phased out. All credentials issued after August 2019, will be the modified credential. **Any credentials with a magnetic strip and no tactile feature with an issue date after August 31, 2019, are fraudulent.** As a reminder, any credentials with the previous style (beach background) with an issue date after January 1, 2018, are fraudulent.

To help answer questions, please see the enclosed trifold brochure detailing the changes included in Florida's redesigned driver license and identification card. Our website, [flhsmv.gov/newDL](http://flhsmv.gov/newDL), provides additional resources for you, your staff and customers. In addition, the department is offering a law enforcement guide on the enhancements. To request a digital or printed copy of the guide for you and your staff, please send a request to [newDL@flhsmv.gov](mailto:newDL@flhsmv.gov).

Our goal is to provide the best service and maintain the highest level of security for all Floridians. If you have any questions about the new credential, please contact our team at [newDL@flhsmv.gov](mailto:newDL@flhsmv.gov). We appreciate your continued partnership.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Rhodes  
Executive Director

Gene Spaulding  
Director, Florida Highway Patrol

Enclosure



## Florida Driver License and Identification Card

### 2D Barcode Reader Calibration Sheet - 2016 AAMVA Standard

Card Revision Date: 05/01/2019

This sheet may be printed on a standard desktop laser printer at 600 dpi resolution or better.


The printed barcode on this sheet should be readable by most high-density 2D barcode (PDF417) capable optical readers using either laser or Charge Coupled Device (CCD) technology.

#### 2D Barcode (PDF417) from Card Back



This example displays a typical Class E driver license, with sample data populated. Refer to the following page for full detail of the 2D barcode possible contents.

#### Sample Class E Florida Driver License



#### Example PDF 417 decodes as:

ANSI 636010090002DL00410249ZF02900058DLDAQS123456579010  
 DCSSAMPLE  
 DDEU  
 DACNICK  
 DDFU  
 DADNONE  
 DDOU  
 DCAE  
 DCBNONE  
 DCDNONE  
 DBD07272016  
 DBB01121957  
 DBA01122024  
 DBC1  
 DAU070 IN  
 DAG123 MAIN STREET  
 DAITALLAHASSEE  
 DAJFL  
 DAK000001234  
 DCFQ931611290000

DCGUSA  
 DCK0110009295000261  
 DDAF  
 DDB05012019  
 ZFZFA  
 ZFB  
 ZFCSAFE DRIVER  
 ZFD  
 ZFE  
 ZFF  
 ZFG  
 ZFH  
 ZFI  
 ZFJ  
 ZFK



## Florida Driver License and Identification Card

Data Content and Format as Encoded in Example PDF417 - 2016 AAMVA Standard, Card Revision Date: 05/01/2019

FIELD	AAMVA Max Data (A=Alpha, N=Numeric, S=Symbol)	ELEMENT ID	CONTENT
Customer ID Number	13/ANS	DAG	S123456579010
Customer Family Name	40/ANS	DCS	SAMPLE
Family Name Truncation	1/A	DDF	U
Customer First Name	40/ANS	DAC	NICK
First Name Truncation	1/A	DDF	U
Customer Middle Name(s)	40/ANS	DAD	NONE
Middle Name Truncation	1/A	DDG	U
Jurisdiction-specific vehicle class	1/ANS	DCA	E
Jurisdiction-specific restriction codes	5/ANS	DCB	NONE
Jurisdiction-specific endorsement codes	5/ANS	DCD	NONE
Document Issue Date	8/N (MMDDCCYY)	DBD	07272016
Date of Birth	8/N (MMDDCCYY)	DBB	01121957
Document Expiration Date	8/N (MMDDCCYY)	DBA	01122024
Physical Description - Sex	1/AN (1=M, 2=F, 9=X)	DBC	1
Physical Description - Height	6/ANS	DAU	070 IN
Physical Description - Eye Color	3/A	DAY	N/A - DAY tag & contents intentionally omitted on all cards
Address - Street 1	35/ANS	DAG	123 MAIN STREET
Address - City	20/ANS	DAI	TALLAHASSEE
Address - Jurisdiction Code	2/A	DAJ	FL
Address - Postal Code	11/AN	DAK	000001234
Document Discriminator (Transaction ID)	13/ANS	DCF	0931611290000
Country Identification	3/A	DCG	USA
Suffix	5/ANS	DCU	JR *
Inventory Control Number	25/ANS	DCK	0110009295000261 (This is ID barcode)
Compliance Type	1/A	DDA	F
Card Revision Date	8/N	DDB	05012019
Limited Duration Document Indicator	1/N	DDC	1 *
Under 21 Until	8/N (MMDDCCYY)	DDJ	01122017 * (Applies to minor formats only. Not shown on example)
Organ Donor	1/N	DDK	1 *
Veteran	1/N	DOL	1 *
Replaced Date	8/N (CCYYMMDD)	ZFZFA	20170112 *
Special Restrictions	24/ANS	ZFB	HAZMAT 011218,HD 011218 *
Safe Driver Indicator	11/A	ZFC	SAFE DRIVER
Sexual Predator	2/A	ZFD	SP *
Sex Offender Statute	2/A	ZFE	SO *
Insulin Dependent	11/AS	ZFF	INSULIN DEP *
Developmental Disability	24/AS	ZFG	DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY *
Hearing Impaired	20/AS	ZFH	DEAF/HARD OF HEARING *
Fish & Wildlife Designations (Indicators card back)	14/AS (SP=Sportsman, BO=Boater, FW=Freshwater Fishing, SW=Saltwater Fishing, HT=Hunting)	ZFI	SP,BO,FW,SW,HT * (Indicators always encode in same order and print in fixed location on card back)
Customer Number	10/N	ZFJ	0123456789 *
Reserved for Future Use	3/ANS	ZFK	X,0 *

\* Applicable field, but not shown in example



## GETTING YOUR MODIFIED CREDENTIAL

### IN PERSON:

Beginning May 2019, the modified credential will be offered at select locations, with additional locations each month. The modified credential will be available at all locations statewide by the end of August 2019.

To renew or replace a credential, visit a local service center listed at [flhsmv.gov/locations](http://flhsmv.gov/locations).

### ONLINE:

The modified credential will be available for online renewals at [GoRenew.com](http://GoRenew.com) by the end of August 2019.



For more information on  
Florida's driver license  
and ID card,  
visit [flhsmv.gov/newDL](http://flhsmv.gov/newDL).

## SAFE SECURE CONVENIENT

2019 MODIFICATIONS  
Enhancing the Security of  
Florida's Driver License and ID Card



**FLHSMV**  
FLORIDA HIGHWAY SAFETY • LAW ENFORCEMENT

"FLORIDA"  
**ARRIVE ALIVE**  
— BUCKLE UP —

**FLHSMV**  
FLORIDA HIGHWAY SAFETY • LAW ENFORCEMENT

Rev. 4/25/2019



## MODIFIED CREDENTIAL, ENHANCED SECURITY

Starting in May 2019, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles will begin issuing a modified Florida driver license and ID card with enhanced security features. By the end of August 2019, the modified credential will be available at all service centers throughout Florida and online.

Individuals are not required to replace their current driver license or ID card during this time, unless their current credential has reached its expiration or a required change is needed, such as a name or address change. Previous driver license and ID cards will still be in use alongside the new credential until replaced or phased out.

Florida's modified credential incorporates the removal of the magnetic strip on the back of the card, the addition of a tactile security feature and changes to the data and data layout.

The enhanced security features ensures Floridians continue to receive the most secure over-the-counter driver license and ID card on the market today.

### DESIGNATED HEADER COLORS



## SAFE SECURE CONVENIENT

### ENHANCED SECURITY FEATURES AND DESIGNATIONS



For more information on Florida's driver license and ID card, visit [flhsmv.gov/newDL](http://flhsmv.gov/newDL).